Monthly Archives: May 2016
|May 31, 2016||Posted by admin under China M&A, English, Investment in Emerging Economies|
Chinese economics is unprecedentedly slowing down and what incurs most anxiety is the failure of previously effective policy to stimulate market demands. In response to such uncertainties from the demand end, how to improve the other end of the economic circle, namely the production end, has become one of the hottest terminology politically and academically. Simply put, if no one is buying your products, you will have to lower your costs if you want to survive the difficult instead of simply winding up your entrepreneurship. …
|May 25, 2016||Posted by admin under China M&A, English, Investment in Emerging Economies|
Chinese people are reputable for ““work hard, save hard“ and barely take leaves. Therefore, even though most foreign companies offered way more generous annual leaves entitlements to the Chinese staff beyond the statutory annual entitlements, it is very common that such contractual annual leave entitlements will not be taken in whole during a calendar year.
Most foreign companies in China will have internal policy about such accrued but untaken annual leaves. The routine approach is to provide through internal policy that such untaken annual leaves cannot be carried forward and will be considered forfeited otherwise.
New Safe Harbors for Fixed Re-Sale Price Arrangement under NDRC Guidance of Automobile Anti-Monopoly?
|May 16, 2016||Posted by admin under China M&A, English, Investment in Emerging Economies, RMB Fund|
Since 2014, continuous anti-monopoly enforcement by the Chinese Development and Reform Committee (“NDRC”) in the scale of hundreds of million RMB has raised serious compliance concern among foreign investors, particularly those in the area of trading and distribution. Among others, the landmark enforcement against Mercedes Benz reached the unprecedented amount of RMB 350 million.
Most of such enforcement targeted the very common commercial arrangement that fix or restrict the minimum re-sell price of the distributor to a third party (“Vertical Pricing Restriction”). Vertical Pricing Restriction is explicitly prohibited under Article 14 of PRC Anti-Monopoly Law, unless the exemptions exemptions under Article 15 of PRC Anti-Monopoly Law may apply (“Article 15 Exemptions”). …